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The Influence of Corporate Governance on Management Earnings Forecast 
Behaviour in a Low Private Litigation Environment 
 
Abstract 
We examine the influence of three external corporate governance mechanisms – 
continuous disclosure regulatory reform, analyst following and ownership concentration 
and one internal corporate governance mechanism – board structure, on the likelihood, 
frequency, horizon, precision and accuracy of management earnings forecasts in the low 
private litigation environment of New Zealand. Based on a sample of 1,082 
management earnings forecasts issued by 125 firms listed on the New Zealand 
Exchange during the 1998-2007 financial reporting periods, we provide strong evidence 
that these four corporate governance mechanisms have a significant influence on 
management earnings forecast behaviour after effectively controlling for endogeneity, 
multicollinearity and self-selection bias problems. Specifically, firms monitored by 
effective corporate governance mechanisms were more inclined to pre-empt their 
earnings announcements with earnings forecasts (overall, non-routine and quantitative) 
and provide these earnings forecasts more frequently. These earnings forecasts issued 
by these firms were less optimistically biased. In addition, firms having more directors 
with accounting expertise on their boards and audit committees were more likely to 
provide earnings forecasts with longer horizon and smaller forecast error. Board size 
and the existence of a formally established audit committee are shown to have a positive 
impact on forecast error. A possible interpretation of our findings is that effective 
corporate governance mechanisms have been able to substitute for private enforcement 
alternative. Our findings should have important implications for the other low private 
litigation environments as well as for high private litigation environments such as the 
United States given the high economic and social costs that have been identified as 
being related to private litigation. 
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1 Introduction 
Management earnings forecasts represent one of the key disclosure mechanisms through 
which management communicates their expectation of a firm’s earnings to the capital 
markets prior to the release of mandatory earnings announcements. The important role 
played by management earnings forecasts in the efficient functioning of the capital 
markets, including reducing information asymmetry, lowering cost of capital and 
improving investor confidence, has motivated a great deal of research investigating the 
various aspects of management earnings forecasts. 
Despite the rich literature on management earnings forecasts, there is much less theory 
and empirical evidence about how firms choose certain forecast characteristics over 
which management has the most control, than about why firms decide to issue earnings 
forecasts and the subsequent impact of this earnings forecast behaviour on the capital 
markets. Prior research studies examining the association between corporate governance 
and management earnings forecast behaviour tend to focus on specific aspects of 
corporate governance rather than a combined set of external and internal corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
In addition, most research on management earnings forecasts is conducted in the high 
private litigation environment of the United States (the U.S.) where the private litigation 
risk is posited to be a primary determinant of management earnings forecast behaviour. 
The threat of private enforcement might act as substitute for corporate governance 
mechanisms as an effective tool to manage and supervise management activities 
including their earnings forecast behaviour (La-Porta et al., 2006). This means that the 
impact of corporate governance mechanisms on management earnings forecast 
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behaviour could be dependent on the effectiveness of the alternative mechanism of 
private enforcement. Therefore, a major challenge to researchers providing empirical 
evidence about the relative merits of various corporate governance mechanisms versus 
private enforcement is the difficulty associated with isolating the incremental impacts of 
corporate governance and private enforcement. This is especially the case in the U.S. 
where the strength of various external corporate governance mechanisms and private 
enforcement is high. It is possible that the incremental benefits of various corporate 
governance mechanisms could be stronger and/or more easily identifiable in a low 
private litigation environment.1
New Zealand has been characterised as a low private litigation environment with high 
litigation costs, heavy reliance on individual proof, low damage awards, prohibition on 
contingent fees and alternative funding together with an anti-litigious culture (Dunstan 
et al., 2011). Therefore, New Zealand provides a unique setting to study the impact of 
corporate governance on management earnings forecast behaviour in the absence of cost 
effective private enforcement alternatives. 
 
We examine the influence of three external corporate governance mechanisms – 
continuous disclosure regulatory reform, analyst following and ownership concentration 
and one internal corporate governance mechanism – board structure, on the likelihood, 
frequency, horizon, precision and accuracy of management earnings forecasts using a 
sample of 1,082 management earnings forecasts issued by 125 firms listed on the New 
Zealand Exchange (NZX) during the 31 January 1998 to 31 December 2007 financial 
reporting periods. Our results provide strong evidence that the four corporate 
                                                 
1 New Zealand is characterised by a mostly voluntary corporate governance framework. While the 
Securities Commission issued the principles and guidelines for corporate governance, it has no force of 
law. 
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governance mechanisms have a significant influence on management earnings forecast 
behaviour after effectively controlling for endogeneity, multicollinearity and self-
selection bias problems. Specifically, firms monitored by effective corporate 
governance mechanisms were more inclined to pre-empt their earnings announcements 
with earnings forecasts (overall, non-routine and quantitative) and provide these 
earnings forecasts more frequently. The earnings forecasts issued by these firms were 
less optimistically biased. In addition, firms having more directors with accounting 
expertise on their boards and audit committees were more likely to provide earnings 
forecasts with longer horizon and smaller forecast error. Board size and the existence of 
a formally established audit committee are shown to have a positive impact on forecast 
error. A possible interpretation of our findings is that effective corporate governance 
mechanisms are able to be more beneficial in monitoring corporate behaviour in 
circumstances where private enforcement is not a cost effective alternative. 
The remainder of our study is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises relevant 
corporate governance and management earnings forecast literature and describes the 
research hypotheses. An overview of the research design is provided in section 3. 
Section 4 presents the results and our study concludes in section 5. 
2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 The Importance of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is especially important to ameliorate those agency problems 
arising from the separation of ownership and control and where such problems cannot 
be satisfactorily contracted away due to significant uncertainty, information asymmetry 
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and contracting costs (Hart, 1995). Agency costs could be also mitigated by effective 
corporate governance mechanisms through enhanced corporate disclosure (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). In the broadest sense, corporate governance mechanisms could arise 
externally from: law/regulation, capital, control, labour and product markets, capital 
market information and analysis, the market for services, and private sources of external 
oversight. Alternatively, they could be internal mechanisms, for example: board of 
directors, managerial incentives, a firm’s capital structure, bylaw and charter provisions, 
and internal control systems (Gillan, 2006). In the context of our study, there are three 
external mechanisms – continuous disclosure regulatory reform, analyst following and 
ownership concentration and one internal mechanism – board structure that are 
considered to be the most relevant. 
Continuous Disclosure Regulatory Reform 
In 2002, as part of a broad reform of securities regulation in New Zealand, the 
Securities Markets Act 1988 was amended to include statutory sanctions to support the 
NZX’s continuous disclosure listing rules. The intention of this continuous disclosure 
reform in New Zealand was to create a fully informed environment where firms update 
the market with all material information on a timely basis (Securities Markets 
Amendment Act 2002, Section 19A).2
                                                 
2 The amended Act requires NZX-listed firms to disclose any material information to investors as they 
arise. Failure to comply with the amended Act, and/or orders made by the Securities Commission in 
relation to continuous disclosure, can lead to civil penalties of up to $300,000 and criminal penalties of up 
to $30,000. 
 Even though the effectiveness of this continuous 
disclosure regulatory reform has been challenged due to a lack of evidence of strong 
enforcement by either the NZX or the Securities Commission, several New Zealand 
research studies provide consistent empirical evidence supporting the effectiveness of 
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this regulatory intervention. The information component of the bid-ask spread for less 
liquid stocks, the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts and the stock market 
reaction to earnings announcements and management earnings forecasts, all decreased 
in the post-reform period (Frijns et al., 2008; Dunstan et al., 2009; Huang et al., 2009). 
In addition, Huang et al. (2009) and Dunstan et al. (2011) found that firms increased the 
number of price-sensitive disclosures and earnings forecasts, which are more precise 
and accurate, to the capital market in the post-reform period. 
Analyst Following 
Analysts, employed by investment banks, brokerage houses and large institutional 
investors, are argued to perform a monitoring role, which reduces the opportunities 
available to managers to capture excessive pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits from 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managers will be more likely to engage in 
opportunistic activities in the absence of such monitoring activities by analysts. Prior 
research provides evidence consistent with the monitoring role by analysts. Moyer et al. 
(1989) document that analysts’ monitoring acted as an efficient device to reduce agency 
costs associated with the separation of ownership and control. Chung and Jo (1996) 
argue that the monitoring activities of analysts motivate managers, thus reducing agency 
costs. Additionally, Chan et al. (2008) show that firms which were followed by a greater 
number of analysts were more likely to issue earnings forecasts and inclined to forecast 
earnings more frequently. 
Ownership Concentration 
The theoretical debate on the benefits of concentrated ownership divides into two 
competing hypotheses: the efficient-monitoring and the opportunistic hypotheses. The 
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supporters of the efficient-monitoring hypothesis propose that large shareholders are 
better at monitoring managers’ activities compared to small shareholders as they are 
able to absorb greater monitoring and takeover costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), 
execute their vested fiduciary responsibilities with greater expertise (Pound, 1988), and 
acquire more precise signals of management efforts (Berle and Means, 1932; Huddart, 
1993). According to the opportunistic hypothesis, large shareholders could exercise 
their absolute controlling rights in the firm, exerting a powerful influence on managers 
in order to maximise their own benefits at the cost of small shareholders (Makhija and 
Patton, 2004). Large shareholders and managers could also find it mutually 
advantageous to work together and this co-operation would reduce the ability of other 
shareholders to monitor managers’ activities (Pound, 1988; Holmstrom and Tirole, 
1993). 
Prior research provides evidence for an increase (a decrease) in the benefits of 
concentrated ownership at a low (high) level of ownership concentration. For instance, 
Makhija and Patton (2004) find that the extent of voluntary disclosure is positively 
related to ownership concentration at a low level of ownership concentration but is 
negatively related to ownership concentration at a high level of ownership 
concentration. Navissi and Naiker (2006) report a non-linear relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm value by documenting a positive (negative) association 
with firm value at lower (higher) levels of ownership. 
Board Structure 
The board of directors are viewed as being “the lynchpin of corporate governance” 
(Gillan, 2006, p. 385). Fama and Jensen (1983) characterise the responsibilities of the 
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board of directors as being both the ratification of management decisions and the 
monitoring of management performance. It is posited that the monitoring role of the 
board of directors is dependent on the degree of independence, size, meeting frequency, 
and the degree of financial expertise of the board itself and its sub-committees (John 
and Senbet, 1998; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). 
First, the separated appointment of a Chairman from a CEO and the greater proportion 
of non-executive directors on the board and its sub-committees are argued to enhance 
the monitoring performance of the board (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Ho and Wong 
(2001) find that firms which combined the roles of Chairman and CEO tended to 
withhold unfavourable information. The duality of the Chairman and CEO roles is also 
associated with lower levels of voluntary disclosure (Gul and Leung, 2004; Cheng and 
Courtenay, 2006). According to Chen and Jaggi (2000), firms with a higher percentage 
of non-executive directors on the board were more engaged and provided more 
comprehensive statutory disclosures. Firms with a higher level of board and audit 
committee independence were less likely to engage in earnings management (Klein, 
2002). 
Second, board size is argued to enhance board monitoring performance, as appointing 
more relevant directors to the board would enhance board knowledge and provide 
greater capacity to share the monitoring responsibilities (Song and Windram, 2004; 
Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). However, larger boards are posited to be less flexible 
and less efficient due to higher coordination costs and less effective communication 
(John and Senbet, 1998; Coles et al., 2008). According to Bradbury et al. (2006), firms 
with a greater number of directors on the board tended to have high earnings quality. 
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However, Yermack (1996) documents a negative relationship between board size and 
firm value. 
Third, board meeting frequency is argued to be indicative of the amount of time the 
board spends on monitoring management, thus enhancing the board monitoring 
performance (Vafeas, 1999). According to Vafeas (1999), the board of directors of 
firms which had experienced share price declines were inclined to meet more frequently 
and, as a result, operating performance improved in the following year. Carcello et al. 
(2002) document that greater board meeting frequency is associated with higher audit 
fees. Therefore, they conclude that board meetings complement auditor oversight. 
Additionally, Abbott et al. (2004) show that firms where the audit committee met at 
least four times per year were less likely to be required to restate their financial reports. 
Lastly, the presence of directors with accounting or financial expertise on the board and 
audit committee is argued to enhance the board monitoring performance (Karamanou 
and Vafeas, 2005). According to Felo et al. (2003), firms with a higher percentage of 
directors with accounting or financial expertise on the audit committee tended to have 
higher financial reporting quality. Firms which had at least one financial expert on 
board were less likely to be required to restate earnings (Abbott et al., 2004). 
Interestingly, Defond et al. (2005) document that accounting expertise, not the overall 
financial expertise, is a determinant of the improvement of an audit committee’s ability 
to ensure high financial reporting quality, especially for firms with a strong corporate 
governance structure. Therefore, the presence of an accounting expert on the board and 
the audit committee enhances board monitoring performance. 
2.2 Corporate Governance and Management Earnings Forecast Behaviour 
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The management earnings forecast literature suggests that managers’ decision to 
provide earnings forecasts can involve significant benefits as well as costs and managers 
will balance these benefits and costs when determining the optimal level of earnings 
forecast disclosure for their firms (Hirst et al., 2008). According to Trueman (1986), 
management earnings forecasts give investors a more favourable assessment of the 
managers’ ability to anticipate economic changes and provide reliable production plans, 
thus translating into a higher firm market value. Management earnings forecasts could 
reduce the level of information asymmetry in the capital markets (Coller and Yohn, 
1997). Frankel et al. (1995) suggest that firms’ ability to assess the capital markets more 
frequently is enhanced by the issuance of management earnings forecasts. Management 
earnings forecasts could also assist firms to reduce litigation and reputation costs 
(Skinner, 1994, 1997; Field et al., 2005). In addition, management earnings forecasts 
could facilitate better clarity and investor understanding (Graham et al., 2005). 
Other researchers have identified the costs associated with management earnings 
forecasts. The disclosure of earnings forecasts could increase proprietary, litigation and 
reputation costs (Francis et al., 1994; Bamber and Cheon, 1998; Baginski et al., 2004). 
Specifically, firms with high litigation risk were less likely to provide earnings forecasts 
(Francis et al., 1994). According to Wang (2007), firms with higher proprietary 
information costs reduced their public disclosures following the introduction of the 
Regulation Fair Disclosure 2000 (Reg FD). 
La-Porta et al. (2006) propose that the strength of private litigation could be considered 
as an integral aspect of the investor protection environment. A jurisdiction which 
features a strong culture or private litigation could provide a natural monitoring 
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mechanism for shareholders to prevent management’s opportunistic behaviour. The 
threat of private enforcement might act as a substitute to the corporate governance 
mechanisms as an effective tool to manage and supervise management activities. 
Tinaikar (2008) investigates the relationship between the proportion of outside directors 
and management earnings forecast behaviour across two legal regimes with unequal 
private litigation costs – the U.S. and Canada. His findings reveal that outside directors 
and private enforcement act as substitutes when determining management earnings 
forecast behaviour. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the incremental benefits of 
corporate governance mechanisms could be stronger and/or be more easily identifiable 
in an environment when low private litigation prevails. 
In New Zealand, the effectiveness of private litigation taken by shareholders and others 
is impaired by a combination of high costs, an onerous burden of individual reliance 
proof, damages determined by judges rather than juries resulting in low damage awards, 
the prohibition on contingent fees and litigation funding together with an anti-litigious 
culture (Dunstan et al., 2011). Therefore, we contend that effective corporate 
governance mechanisms may play a more important role in determining behaviour in 
the low private litigation environment of New Zealand. Therefore, the hypotheses 
regarding to forecast likelihood and frequency are stated as follows: 
Forecast Likelihood 
H1: Firms that are monitored by more effective corporate governance 
mechanisms are more likely to issue management earnings forecasts 
(overall and non-routine). 
Forecast Frequency 
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H2: The frequency of management earnings forecasts (overall and non-
routine) is higher for firms that are monitored by more effective corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
Following the decision to release the earnings forecasts to the market, firms must then 
decide on the qualitative characteristics of the earnings forecasts they are reporting 
(King et al., 1990). Three key qualitative characteristics of management earnings 
forecasts are forecast horizon, precision and accuracy, which capture the timeliness, 
specificity and accuracy of the earnings forecasts, respectively (Hirst et al., 2008). 
Prior research documents significant variation in earnings forecasts’ characteristics 
across jurisdictions with different levels of private litigation risk. There is consistent 
evidence that firms from lower private litigation risk jurisdictions were more likely to 
provide timelier and more precise earnings forecasts (Baginski et al., 2002; Frost, 
2004). While U.S. firms tended to provide more pessimistic earnings forecasts to pre-
empt litigation risk (Skinner, 1994), Japanese firms consistently issued over-optimistic 
earnings forecasts as they faced no obvious legal sanctions (Kato et al., 2009). 
An informative and credible management earnings forecast is expected to be timely, 
precise and accurate (smaller forecast error and less optimistically biased) (King et al., 
1990; Tinaikar, 2008). In the low private litigation environment of New Zealand, it is 
argued that corporate governance as an alternative monitoring mechanism for 
monitoring managerial self-interest as manifested in the firms’ earnings forecast policies 
could enhance the timeliness, precision and accuracy of management earnings forecasts. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses regarding forecast horizon, precision and accuracy 
are tested: 
 12 
 
Forecast Horizon 
H3: The horizon of management earnings forecasts is longer for firms that 
are monitored by more effective corporate governance mechanisms. 
Forecast Precision 
H4a: Firms that are monitored by more effective corporate governance 
mechanisms are more likely to issue quantitative (open-ended, range and 
point) management earnings forecasts. 
H4b: The frequency of quantitative (open-ended, range and point) 
management earnings forecasts is higher for firms that are monitored by 
more effective corporate governance mechanisms. 
H4c: The precision of management earnings forecasts is higher for firms 
that are monitored by more effective corporate governance mechanisms. 
Forecast Accuracy 
H5a: The error of management earnings forecasts is smaller for firms that 
are monitored by more effective corporate governance mechanisms. 
H5b: The management earnings forecasts are less optimistically biased for 
firms that are monitored by more effective corporate governance 
mechanisms. 
3 Research Design 
3.1 Study Period and Sample 
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The selected study period is an eleven-year period encompassing all market 
announcements made by firms regarding the financial years ending between 31 January 
1998 and 31 December 2007.3
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 The final sample comprises 125 NZX-listed firms. These 
firms cover a total of 897 firm-years during which a total of 32,690 market 
announcements were issued. All 32,690 announcements were carefully read to identify 
announcements containing management earnings forecasts. Among these 32,690 market 
announcements, there are 1,082 announcements including management earnings 
forecasts. These 1,082 management earnings forecasts include both forecasts of half-
yearly and annual earnings. Among these 897 firm-years, there are 265 firm-years 
where firms fully disclosed the level of independence, size, number of meetings and 
level of accounting expertise of boards of directors and audit committees. Among these 
265 firm-years, the total of management earnings forecasts issued is 350. This sub-
sample of 265 firm-years and 350 management earnings forecasts provides a basis for 
additional tests regarding the influence of various board structure indicators including 
the level of independence, size, number of meetings and level of accounting expertise of 
the boards of directors and audit committees on management earnings forecast 
behaviour. Details about this sample selection process are provided in Table 1. 
3.2 Data Sources 
                                                 
3 The starting financial year ending on 31 January 1998 is chosen as it is the earliest financial year where 
the disclosure data are made available on the NZX database. The ending financial year ending on 31 
December 2007 is selected to avoid any contamination that may arise from the further amendments to the 
continuous disclosure provisions under the Securities Markets Amendment Act 2002 which came into 
force on 29 February 2008. These amendments give the Securities Commission the power to seek 
pecuniary penalties and compensation from individual directors and officers involved in any continuous 
disclosure breaches. This decision to avoid the confounding impact of the further amendments to the 
Securities Markets Act 1988 is supported by the Securities Commission’s recent launching of a case 
against Nuplex Industries Limited and its current and former directors for the breaches of continuous 
disclosure requirements. 
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The NZX listing status was extracted from the Events section of the NZX database as at 
17 September 2008. The cross-listing status was taken directly from the NZX helpline 
services. The analyst following information was taken from the Forecasts section of the 
NZX database. All market announcements were extracted from the Announcements 
section of the NZX database. Data related to ownership concentration and board 
structure were carefully extracted from the annual reports which are provided in the 
Annual Reports section of the NZX database. Accounting and market-related data were 
obtained from either the NZX or Datastream database. 
3.3 Classifications of Management Earnings Forecasts 
The identified management earnings forecasts are classified according to their 
underlying event (routine or non-routine) associated with the announcements, news 
content (bad, neutral or good), horizon, precision (qualitative, open-ended, range or 
point) and accuracy (error and bias). Details about the classifications are provided in 
Figure 1. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
3.4 Measures of Four Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Continuous Disclosure Regulatory Reform 
The statutory-backed continuous disclosure reform came into effect from 1 December 
2002 under the Securities Markets Amendment Act 2002. Therefore, 1 December 2002 
is chosen as the cut-off between the pre-reform and post-reform periods. All firm-years 
with financial reporting dates ending before (after) 1 December 2002 are classified to be 
in the pre-reform (post-reform) period. 
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Analyst Following 
In New Zealand, less than 50 percent of  NZX-listed firms are followed by analysts 
(Dunstan et al., 2009). Therefore, whether or not a firm is followed by analysts is used 
as a proxy for the analyst following of this firm. 
Ownership Concentration 
The Herfindahl index is used to measure the level of ownership concentration and is 
calculated as follows. 
Her�indahl (𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑁) =  �(The total number of shares held by shareholder i
The total number of shares outstanding )25
i=1
 
A two-stage least squares is employed to address the concern about the endogenous 
relationship between ownership concentration and management earnings forecast 
behaviour4 and to detect a one-way causal effect of ownership concentration on 
management earnings forecast behaviour. Shareholder intensity as measured by the ratio 
of the total number of shareholders to the total number of shares outstanding is chosen 
as an instrumental variable.5
Board Structure 
 
The degree of independence, size, meeting frequency and the level of accounting 
expertise on the board of directors and its audit committee are considered as indicators 
                                                 
4 Research studies on the relationship between ownership structure and management earnings forecasts 
encounter the common problem of endogeneity between these two measures (Healy et al., 1999; Bushee 
and Noe, 2000; Ajinkya et al., 2005). 
5 In the first stage, the Herfindahl index is regressed on shareholder intensity to obtain the fitted values. In 
the second stage, these fitted values replace the original Herfindahl index in the main models. 
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for board effectiveness. These board structure indicators are initially identified and 
measured as shown in Figure 2. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
There is significant correlation among these board structure indicators (see Table 2); 
therefore, in order to avoid a multicollinearity problem and to capture the essence of 
board effectiveness as represented by these indicators, we employ exploratory principal 
component factor analysis (PCA).6
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 The use of PCA reduces the large number of highly 
collinear board structure indicators into factors that retain most of the variance as in the 
original board structure indicators. 
Four board structure indicators, including CEOCHAIR, BRDINDP, BRDSIZE and AC 
are incorporated into the PCA for the full sample of 897 firm-years.7 The initial PCA of 
these four indicators indentifies two interpretable factors, including BRDINDP (board 
independence) and BRDSIZEAC (board size and audit committee) (see Table 3, Panel 
A). Nine board structure indicators, including CEOCHAIR, BRDINDP, BRDSIZE, 
BRDMEET, BRDACCEXP, ACINDP, ACSIZE, ACMEET and ACACCEXP are 
incorporated into the PCA for the sub-sample of 265 firm-years.8
                                                 
6 This approach has been used by other corporate governance researchers (e.g. Larcker et al. (2007)). 
 As apparent from 
Table 3, Panel B, the initial PCA of these nine board structure indicators indentifies four 
interpretable board structure factors including BRDAC_INDP (board and audit 
7 Across all 897 firm-years in the final sample, firms consistently disclosed only the level of 
independence and size of the board of directors and whether there existed a formally established audit 
committee in their annual reports. 
8 Among the final sample of 897 firm-years, there are 265 firm-years where firms fully disclosed the level 
of independence, size, meeting frequency and level of accounting expertise on both boards of directors 
and audit committees in their annual reports. 
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committee independence), BRDAC_SIZE (board and audit committee size), 
BRDAC_MEET (board and audit committee meeting) and BRDAC_ACCEXP (board and 
audit committee accounting expertise). 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
According to Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), there are other factors which might 
impact both board structure and firm attributes; therefore, a spurious correlation could 
be observed between board structure and firm attributes. The firm attributes mentioned 
in Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) would include its management earnings forecast 
behaviour. Denis and Sarin (1999) document that the board structure is related to firm 
size and growth prospects. In order to address the concern about the expected spurious 
relationship between board structure and management earnings forecast behaviour and 
detect a one-way causal effect of board structure on management earnings forecast 
behaviour, a two-stage least squares method is utilised. The natural logarithm of the 
total assets and the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book 
value of equity are used as proxies for firm size and growth prospects, respectively.9
3.5 Hypothesis Testing Procedures 
 
Probit, multinomial probit, ordered probit, Poisson and linear regression models are 
estimated to make inferences about the hypothesised relationships and to control for the 
                                                 
9 In the first stage, each board structure factor identified in the above PCA is regressed on the two proxies 
for firm size and growth prospects and the residuals of each board structure factor were obtained. These 
residuals represent the unexplained portion of board structure factors which are not explained by the firm 
characteristics identified in the prior literature. In the second stage, the residuals of these board structure 
factors replace the original board structure factors in the models used to test the impact of board structure 
on the likelihood, frequency, horizon, precision and accuracy of management earnings forecasts. 
Specifically, for the full sample of 897 firm-years, the residuals BRDINDPR and BRDSIZEACR replace 
the original BRDINDP and BRDSIZEAC factors, respectively. For the sub-sample of 265 firm-years, the 
residuals BRDAC_INDPR, BRDAC_SIZER, BRDAC_MEETR and BRDAC_ACCEXPR replace the 
original BRDAC_INDP, BRDAC_SIZE, BRDAC_MEET and BRDAC_ACCEXP factors, respectively. 
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firm-specific attributes, forecast-specific characteristics and the self-selection bias. The 
model specifications for 897 firm-years and 1,082 management earnings forecasts are 
presented in Figure 3. Models 1, 2, 3, 4a-c and 5a-b are used to test H1, H2, H3, H4a-c 
and H5a-b. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
The model specifications for 265 firm-years and 350 management earnings forecasts 
would be similar to those for 897 firm-years and 1,082 management earnings forecasts, 
except for the residuals of the two board structure factors – BRDINDPR and 
BRDSIZEACR being replaced with the residuals of four board structure factors – 
BRDAC_INDPR, BRDAC_SIZER, BRDAC_MEETR and BRDAC_ACCEXPR. 
The definitions of the dependent and independent variables are presented in Figure 4. 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] 
Firm performance, firm size, cross-listing status and growth prospects are widely found 
to influence management earnings forecast behaviour (Hirst et al., 2008). Therefore, 
ECSIGN, BAD, GOOD, ECHANGE, SIZE, CROSSLIST and MB are included as control 
variables. 
Prior research documents a potential trade-off between forecast horizon and forecast 
precision and accuracy (Hirst et al., 2008). As more of the financial reporting period 
elapses and less time remains before the release of mandatory earnings announcements, 
firms possess more information and are more certain about the eventual earnings 
outcome. Therefore, HORIZON is included in model 4c and POINT and HORIZON are 
included models 5a-b as control variables. 
 19 
 
As there are a number of NZX-listed firms issuing multiple earnings forecasts during 
the financial year, Dunstan et al. (2011), which is the only New Zealand study on 
management earnings forecast behaviour to date, focus only on the first management 
earnings forecasts issued prior to the release of the mandatory earnings announcements 
for their forecast horizon testing. While the sole focus on the first management earnings 
forecasts in the forecast horizon testing could reveal how early the firms first update the 
capital markets with their expectations of earnings, this approach might have ignored a 
valuable sample of updated earnings forecasts with a higher level of precision and 
accuracy which could be more informative and relevant to the capital markets. 
Therefore, we include all management earnings forecasts in the forecast horizon testing, 
irrespective of whether the management earnings forecast is the first or an updated one. 
As an updated management earnings forecast always has a shorter horizon than the prior 
ones, MEFORDER is included in model 3 as a control variable. 
It is also shown in Dunstan et al. (2011) that management earnings forecasts released 
through non-routine announcements tended to be more precise. Therefore, NREVENT is 
included in model 4c as a control variable. 
In addition, forecast horizon, precision and accuracy can be observed only among the 
group of firms providing earnings forecasts. As proposed by Heckman (1979), there 
might be a self-selection bias inherent in testing the horizon, precision and accuracy of 
management earnings forecasts. Therefore, the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) is included in 
models 3, 4c and 5a-b as a control variable. Following Heckman's (1979), the IMR is 
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estimated based on model 1 – the probit model estimating the likelihood of firms 
issuing management earnings forecasts. The IMR estimate is calculated as follows.10
IMRi,t = ϕ(E(FORECAST1i,t)Φ(E(FORECAST1i,t) 
 
Prior to estimating the models, the skewness and kurtosis statistics for all the continuous 
variables are checked and extreme values are winsorised to preserve the characteristics 
of the original data while minimising the possible distortion of results by these extreme 
values. The maximum number of observations winsorised is low at the level of 5 
percent of the sample observations. 
4 Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 describes the nature and extent of the sample firm-years and management 
earnings forecasts. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Table 4, Panel A indicates that among the final sample of 897 firm-years, there are 511 
firm-years (56.97%) of which earnings announcements were pre-empted by at least one 
management earnings forecast. Among these 511 pre-empted firm-years, there are 320 
(35.67%) and 191 (21.29%) firm-years of which earnings announcements were pre-
empted by only routine management earnings forecasts and by at least one non-routine 
management earnings forecast, respectively. 212 (23.63%) earnings announcements 
                                                 
10 In this calculation of IMR, ϕ(.) denotes the standard normal probability density function and Φ(.) 
denotes the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random variable. 
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were pre-empted by exclusively qualitative management earnings forecasts and 299 
(33.33%) earnings announcements were pre-empted by at least one quantitative (open-
ended, range and point) management earnings forecast. NZX-listed firms provided up to 
a total of 8 overall, 6 non-routine and 7 quantitative earnings forecasts. 
Table 4, Panel B describes the horizon, precision and accuracy (error and bias) of 1,082 
management earnings forecasts in the final sample. The mean and median of forecast 
horizon are 184 and 168 days, respectively which is far longer than those with an 
average forecast horizon of 71 days issued by U.S. firms and a little shorter than those 
with an average forecast horizon of 188 days issued by Canadian firms provided by 
Baginski et al. (2002). While the proportion of the qualitative management earnings 
forecasts stays at a high level of 46.21%, open-ended, range and point management 
earnings forecasts are only 12.29%, 13.77% and 27.73% of the total number of 
management earnings forecasts, respectively. The percentage of qualitative management 
earnings forecasts is far higher than those reported in the U.S. (11.2%) and Canada 
(11%) by Baginski et al. (2002). The mean and median of forecast error are 0.051 and 
0.004, respectively and the mean and median for forecast bias are 0.034 and 0. The 
mean of forecast error and bias is much larger than the mean of U.S. forecast error 
(0.022) and forecast bias (0.018) documented by Ajinkya et al. (2005). 
In addition, the descriptive statistics for the sub-sample of 265 firm-years and 350 
management earnings forecasts show that the nature and extent are mostly similar to 
those reported for the full sample, except for a lower proportion of qualitative 
management earnings forecasts (33.14%), a higher percentage of range management 
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earnings forecasts (25.71%) and a lower mean of forecast error (0.017) and forecast bias 
(0.004). 
The descriptive statistics for corporate governance indicators are provided in Table 5. 
Among 897 firm-years, 523 firm-years (58.31%) are related to the post-reform period 
and 410 firm-years (45.71%) are followed by analysts. The mean ownership 
concentration is 0.185 which is considered to be high according to Brown and Warren-
Boulton (1988)'s concentration benchmark. There are 806 firm-years (89.86%) having 
separate CEO and Chairman and 790 firm-years (88.07%) with a formally established 
audit committee. The means for board independence and board size are 0.820 and 
6.065, respectively. 
Among the sub-sample of 265 firm-years, the percentages of firm-years in the post-
reform period and followed by analysts are higher (71.32% and 66.42%, respectively). 
The mean ownership concentration is also higher at 0.206. The means for board meeting 
and board accounting expertise are 10.472 and 0.265, respectively. The means for audit 
committee independence, size, meeting and accounting expertise are 0.970, 3.472, 3.743 
and 0.400, respectively. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
4.2 Multivariate Results 
Predicted signs for the coefficients on independent variables are provided in Table 6. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
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Tables 7 and 8 present the regression results for the full sample and sub-sample firm-
years and management earnings forecasts. 
[INSERT TABLES 7 AND 8 HERE] 
Continuous Disclosure Regulatory Reform 
The REFORM coefficient is positively significant in FORECAST1, FORECAST2, 
FREQUENCY1, FREQUENCY2, FORECAST3, FREQUENCY3, PRECISION, ERROR 
and BIAS models for the full sample (see Table 7). The enforcement of the continuous 
disclosure regulatory reform has significantly improved the likelihood of firms pre-
empting their earnings announcements with earnings forecasts (overall and non-routine) 
and the frequency and precision of these earnings forecasts, thus supporting H1, H2 and 
H4a-c. Firms tended to provide forecasts with larger error and optimistically biased 
forecasts in the post-reform period; therefore H5a-b are not supported. However, there 
is no noticeable change in forecast error and earnings forecasts were pessimistically 
biased in the post-reform period for the sub-sample, which supports H5b (see Table 8). 
The findings regarding forecast likelihood, frequency and precision are consistent with 
those reported by Dunstan et al. (2011). To some extent, these results are also consistent 
with the findings reported by Chan et al. (2007) that there is a significant increase in the 
level of non-routine bad news earnings forecasts issued by ASX-listed firms in the post-
2000 period due to an increase in continuous disclosure enforcement in Australia. 
However, Dunstan et al. (2011) report a marginal decline in forecast  horizon and a 
significant improvement in forecast error in the post-reform period. 
Analyst Following 
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Table 7 presents positive and significant coefficient on ANALYST in FORECAST1, 
FORECAST2, FREQUENCY1, FREQUENCY2, FORECAST3, FREQUENCY3, 
PRECISION, ERROR and BIAS models for the full sample. Analysts play an important 
role in driving firms to pre-empt their earnings announcements with earnings forecasts 
(overall and non-routine) and to provide these earnings forecasts more frequently, 
supporting H1 and H2. Firms followed by analysts were more inclined to provide more 
precise earnings forecasts; therefore H4a-c were supported. However, these firms 
tended to provide earnings forecasts of larger error and with optimistic bias, which 
rejects H5a-b. However, among the sub-sample, firms followed by analysts were more 
inclined to provide pessimistically biased earnings forecasts (see Table 8). 
These findings are consistent with those reported by Chan et al. (2007) (the likelihood 
and frequency of overall and non-routine earnings forecasts), by Tinaikar (2008) 
(forecast precision) and by Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) (forecast error and bias). 
Ownership Concentration 
The coefficient for H and H2 is significantly positive and negative in FORECAST1, 
FORECAST2, FREQUENCY1, FORECAST3, FREQUENCY3, PRECISION, ERROR 
and BIAS models for the full sample (see Table 7). An increase in ownership 
concentration at a low (high) level of ownership concentration is associated with higher 
(lower) forecast likelihood (overall and non-routine), forecast frequency (overall) and 
forecast precision. Therefore, H1, H2 and H4a-c are supported. However, among the 
sub-sample, an increase in ownership concentration at a low (high) level of ownership 
concentration is related to lower (higher) forecast likelihood (non-routine) and forecast 
frequency (overall, non-routine and quantitative). Larger (smaller) forecast error and 
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optimistically (pessimistically) biased forecasts are associated with an increase in 
ownership concentration at a low (high) level of ownership concentration, which rejects 
H5a-b. 
The reported impact of ownership concentration on the likelihood of firms issuing 
earnings forecasts (overall, non-routine and quantitative) supports the efficient-
monitoring (opportunistic) hypothesis at a low (high) level of ownership concentration. 
To some extent, this evidence is consistent with other research studies on the impact of 
ownership concentration on voluntary disclosure (Makhija and Patton, 2004) and firm 
value (Navissi and Naiker, 2006). However, it is interesting to find that the efficient-
monitoring (opportunistic) hypothesis is supported at a high (low) level of ownership 
concentration regarding the non-routine forecast likelihood, forecast frequency (overall, 
non-routine and quantitative) for the subsample and forecast error and bias for both the 
full sample and sub-sample). 
Board Structure 
Positive and significant coefficients on BRDINDPR, BRDSIZEACR, BRDAC_INDPR, 
BRDAC_SIZER, BRDAC_MEETR and BRDAC_ACCEXPR are reported in 
FORECAST1, FORECAST2, FREQUENCY1, FREQUENCY2, HORIZON, 
FORECAST3, FREQUENCY3, and PRECISION models, thus supporting H1, H2, H3 
and H4a-c (see Tables 7 and 8). The coefficients on BRDINDPR, BRDAC_INDPR and 
BRDAC_ACCEXPR are significantly positive in ERROR model; therefore H5a is 
rejected. However, a marginal significant and negative coefficient of BRDSIZEACR in 
the ERROR model has provided support for H5a. The negative and significant 
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coefficients on BRDSIZEACR, BRDAC_INDPR, BRDAC_SIZER, BRDAC_MEETR and 
BRDAC_ACCEXPR in the BIAS model have supported H5b. 
Three aspects of board structure namely, independence, size and meeting frequency are 
found to improve the likelihood that firms issued earnings forecasts (overall and non-
routine), the frequency of these earnings forecasts (overall and non-routine), forecast 
precision and accuracy (smaller error and less optimistic bias). The level of accounting 
expertise on the board and the audit committee is positively related to the frequency that 
firms issued earnings forecasts (overall and non-routine), forecast horizon and accuracy 
(lack of optimistic bias). However, there is also evidence that firms with a higher level 
of accounting expertise on the board and the audit committee were more inclined to 
issue earnings forecasts of larger error. 
These findings are mostly different from evidence reported in prior research. 
Specifically, Ajinkya et al. (2005) document no association between forecast precision 
and the proportion of outside directors in the U.S. setting. Karamanou and Vafeas 
(2005) show that in the U.S., more precise earnings forecasts were provided by firms 
with a lower percentage of outside directors on the board and a smaller audit committee. 
In Australia, the positive relationship between audit committee independence and the 
likelihood and frequency of firms issuing earnings forecasts is mainly driven by routine 
earnings forecasts over which management has a greater discretion (Chan et al., 2008). 
Overall, it is apparent from the reported findings that firms monitored by effective 
corporate governance mechanisms were more inclined to pre-empt their earnings 
announcements with earnings forecasts (overall, non-routine and quantitative) and 
provide these earnings forecasts more frequently. The earnings forecasts issued by these 
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firms were less optimistically biased. Firms having more directors with accounting 
expertise on their boards and audit committees were more likely to provide timelier 
earnings forecasts. In addition, board size and the existence of a formally established 
audit committee are shown to have a positive impact on forecast error. 
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
A number of sensitivity tests are undertaken to ensure the robustness of the results to 
various conditions. The results of these tests are summarised in Table 9. Overall, the 
sensitivity analysis shows that the results reported in the main findings are robust to 
various alternative conditions. 
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
5 Conclusion 
The objective of our study is to examine the influence of three external corporate 
governance mechanisms – continuous disclosure regulatory reform, analyst following 
and ownership concentration and one internal corporate governance mechanism – board 
structure, on the likelihood, frequency, horizon, precision and accuracy of management 
earnings forecasts in the low private litigation environment of New Zealand. 
Based on a sample of 1,082 management earnings forecasts issued by 125 firms listed 
on the NZX during the 31 January 1998 to 31 December 2007 financial reporting 
periods, we provide strong evidence that four corporate governance mechanisms have a 
significant influence on management earnings forecast behaviour. Our findings prevail 
after effectively controlling for endogeneity, multicollinearity and self-selection bias 
problems. Firms monitored by effective corporate governance mechanisms were more 
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inclined to pre-empt their earnings announcements with earnings forecasts (overall, 
non-routine and quantitative) and provide these earnings forecasts more frequently. 
These earnings forecasts issued by these firms were less optimistically biased. In 
addition, firms having more directors with accounting expertise on their boards and 
audit committees were more likely to provide earnings forecasts with longer horizon 
and smaller forecast error. Board size and the existence of a formally established audit 
committee are shown to have a positive impact on forecast error. It is reasonable to 
conclude that in New Zealand a combination of external and internal corporate 
governance mechanisms has been able to effectively substitute for a private litigation 
alternative. Our findings should have important implications for the other low private 
litigation environments as well as for other high private litigation environments such as 
the U.S. given the high economic and social costs that have been identified as being 
related to private litigation. 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, our study is the first study 
on management earnings forecasts in a low private litigation environment in general and 
in New Zealand in particular which comprehensively analyses the influence of a 
combined set of external and internal corporate governance mechanisms. Second, our 
findings provide strong evidence of the effectiveness of the monitoring role of these 
mechanisms and most of these findings are different from those reported in the prior 
literature. Third, we effectively combined the use of exploratory principal component 
analysis, two-stage least squares and controls for self-selection bias, which has not been 
previously combined in the prior management earnings forecast research. Our study also 
departs from all prior research studies of management earnings forecasts as it considers 
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analyst following as an important component of the external corporate governance 
monitoring system faced by firms rather than as a control variable. 
However, our study does not provide direct evidence regarding the incremental benefits 
of these corporate governance mechanisms compared to the private enforcement 
alternative. Further research could directly compared the impact of a combined set of 
external and internal corporate governance mechanisms on management earnings 
forecast behaviour between two jurisdictions with unequal private litigation costs. 
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Figure 1 
Classifications of Management Earnings Forecasts 
Forecast Event  
Routine Forecast released through periodic announcements common to all firms as required 
under the NZX listing rules or in common practice, which include all mandatory 
periodic financial reports (e.g. quarterly, half-yearly, preliminary and annual 
reports) and other periodic releases associated with repetitive events (e.g. 
chairman’s addresses at the Annual General Meeting and letters to shareholders). 
Non-routine Forecast released through all other announcements which are not classified as 
routine event announcements (e.g. earnings guidance and sales update, etc). 
Forecast News Content  
Bad Forecast news content indicates unfavourable earnings prospect relative to the 
previous earnings announcement or the most recent management earnings forecast. 
Neutral Forecast news content indicates no expected change in earnings relative to the 
previous earnings announcement or the most recent management earnings forecast. 
Good Forecast news content indicates favourable earnings prospect relative to the 
previous earnings announcement or the most recent management earnings forecast. 
Forecast Horizon The number of calendar days until financial year-end, regardless of whether the 
management earnings forecast is related to a half-yearly or annual period. 
Forecast Precision  
Qualitative Forecast where firm provides a general expression (non-numeric) expectation 
about its earnings performance (e.g. “we expect improved earnings performance 
this year”). 
Open-ended Forecast where firm specifies a lower or an upper bound for the expected earnings 
performance (e.g. “we expect the net profit for this year will be greater than $1 
million” or “we are certain that the net income for this year will be lower than $2 
million”). 
Range Forecast contains a numerical range of the firm’s expected earnings performance 
(e.g. “the net profit for this year will be between $1 million and $2 million”). 
Point Forecast indicates a single numerical figure about the firm’s expected earnings 
performance (e.g. “we are confident that the net income for this year will be $1.5 
million”). 
Forecast Accuracy  
Error The absolute value of the difference between forecasted and actual earnings per 
share deflated by the share price at the beginning of the financial year. 
Bias The difference between forecasted and actual earnings per share deflated by the 
share price at the beginning of the financial year. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Board Structure Indicators 
CEOCHAIR A dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 for separate CEO and Chairman and 
0 otherwise. 
BRDINDP The percentage of non-executive directors on the board. 
BRDSIZE The number of directors on the board. 
BRDMEET The number of board meetings held during the year. 
BRDACCEXP The percentage of directors with accounting expertise on the board. 
AC A dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm formally establishes an 
audit committee. 
ACINDP The percentage of non-executive directors on the audit committee. 
ACSIZE The number of directors on the audit committee. 
ACMEET The number of audit committee meetings held during the year. 
ACACCEXP The percentage of directors with accounting expertise on the audit committee. 
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Figure 3 
Model Specifications 
Model 1 FORECAST1i,t = a0 + a1REFORMi,t + a2ANALYSTi,t + a3Hi,t + a4H2i,t + 
a5aBRDINDPRi,t + a5bBRDSIZEACRi,t + a6ECSIGNi,t + a7ECHANGEi,t + a8SIZEi,t 
+ a9CROSSLISTi,t + a10MBi,t + αi,t 
FORECAST2i,t = b0 + b1REFORMi,t + b2ANALYSTi,t + b3Hi,t + b4H2i,t + 
b5aBRDINDPRi,t + b5bBRDSIZEACRi,t + b6ECSIGNi,t + b7ECHANGEi,t + b8SIZEi,t 
+ b9CROSSLISTi,t + b10MBi,t + βi,t 
Model 2 FREQUENCY1i,t = c0 + c1REFORMi,t + c2ANALYSTi,t + c3Hi,t + c4H2i,t + 
c5aBRDINDPRi,t + c5bBRDSIZEACRi,t + c6ECSIGNi,t + c7ECHANGEi,t + c8SIZEi,t 
+ c9CROSSLISTi,t + c10MBi,t + γi,t 
FREQUENCY2i,t = d0 + d1REFORMi,t + d2ANALYSTi,t + d3Hi,t + d4H2i,t + 
d5aBRDINDPRi,t + d5bBRDSIZEACRi,t + d6ECSIGNi,t + d7ECHANGEi,t + d8SIZEi,t 
+ d9CROSSLISTi,t + d10MBi,t + δi,t 
Model 3 HORIZONi,t = e0 + e1REFORMi,t + e2ANALYSTi,t + e3Hi,t + e4H2i,t + e5aBRDINDPRi,t + 
e5bBRDSIZEACRi,t + e6BADi,t + e7GOODi,t + e8ECHANGEi,t + e9SIZEi,t + 
e10CROSSLISTi,t + e11MBi,t + e12MEFORDERi,t + e13IMRi,t + εi,t 
Model 4a FORECAST3i,t = f0 + f1REFORMi,t + f2ANALYSTi,t + f3Hi,t + f4H2i,t + f5aBRDINDPRi,t + 
f5bBRDSIZEACRi,t + f6ECSIGNi,t + f7ECHANGEi,t + f8SIZEi,t + f9CROSSLISTi,t + f10MBi,t 
+ ζi,t 
Model 4b FREQUENCY3i,t = g0 + g1REFORMi,t + g2ANALYSTi,t + g3Hi,t + g4H2i,t + 
g5aBRDINDPRi,t + g5bBRDSIZEACRi,t + g6ECSIGNi,t + g7ECHANGEi,t + g8SIZEi,t + 
g9CROSSLISTi,t + g10MBi,t + ηi,t 
Model 4c PRECISIONi,t = h0 + h1REFORMi,t + h2ANALYSTi,t + h3Hi,t + h4H2i,t + h5aBRDINDPRi,t 
+ h5bBRDSIZEACRi,t + h6BADi,t + h7GOODi,t + h8ECHANGEi,t + h9SIZEi,t + 
h10CROSSLISTi,t + h11MBi,t + h12NREVENTi,t + h13HORIZONi,t + h14IRMi,t + θi,t 
Model 5a ERRORi,t = i0 + i1REFORMi,t + i2ANALYSTi,t + i3Hi,t + i4H2i,t + i5aBRDINDPRi,t + 
i5bBRDSIZEACRi,t + i6BADi,t + i7GOODi,t + i8ECHANGEi,t + i9SIZEi,t + i10CROSSLISTi,t 
+ i11MBi,t + i12POINTi,t + i13HORIZONi,t + i14IRMi,t + ιi,t 
Model 5b BIASi,t = j0 + j1REFORMi,t + j2ANALYSTi,t + j3Hi,t + j4H2i,t + j5aBRDINDPRi,t + 
j5bBRDSIZEACRi,t + j6BADi,t + j7GOODi,t + j8ECHANGEi,t + j9SIZEi,t + j10CROSSLISTi,t 
+ j11MBi,t + j12POINTi,t + j13HORIZONi,t + j14IRMi,t + κi,t 
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Figure 4 
Definitions of Dependent and Independent Variables 
Dependent Variables 
FORECAST1 A dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year’s earnings announcement 
is pre-empted by at least one management earnings forecast and 0 otherwise. 
FORECAST2 An ordinal variable taking the value of 2, 1 and 0 if the current financial year’s earnings 
announcement is pre-empted by at least one non-routine management earnings forecast, solely 
routine management earnings forecasts and no management earnings forecasts, respectively. 
FREQUENCY1 The number of management earnings forecasts released between the actual release dates of the 
mandatory earnings announcements for the prior and the current years. 
FREQUENCY2 The number of non-routine management earnings forecasts released between the actual release 
dates of the mandatory earnings announcements for the prior and the current years. 
HORIZON The number of calendar days between the release date of the management earnings forecast and the 
corresponding financial reporting date. 
FORECAST3 An ordinal variable taking the value of 2, 1 and 0 if the current financial year’s earnings 
announcement is pre-empted by at least one quantitative (open-ended, range and point) 
management earnings forecast, solely qualitative management earnings forecasts and no 
management earnings forecasts, respectively. 
FREQUENCY3 The number of quantitative (open-ended, range and point) management earnings forecasts released 
between the actual release dates of the mandatory earnings announcements for the prior and the 
current years. 
PRECISION An ordinal variable taking the value of 0, 1, 2 and 3 for qualitative, open-ended, range and point 
management earnings forecasts, respectively. POINT (in model 5a-b) is a dichotomous variable 
taking the value of 0 and 1 for range and point management earnings forecasts, respectively. 
ERROR The natural logarithm of the absolute value of the difference between forecasted and actual 
earnings per share deflated by the share price at the beginning of the financial year. 
BIAS The natural logarithm of the transformed difference between the forecasted and actual earnings per 
share deflated by the share price at the beginning of the financial year. 
Untabulated results show that the minimum of forecast bias, which is measured by the differences 
between the forecasted and actual earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the 
financial year, is -1.287. Therefore, forecast bias is added by 1.5 before taking the natural 
logarithm. 
Independent Variables 
REFORM A dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year ends in the post-reform 
period and 0 otherwise. 
ANALYST A dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is followed by analysts and 0 otherwise. 
H The fitted value of the Herfindahl index of concentration of top five largest shareholders 
(OWNCON). 
H2 H square. 
BRDINDPR The residual value of the BRDINDP factor. 
BRDSIZEACR The residual value of the BRDSIZEAC factor. 
BRDAC_INDPR The residual value of the BRDAC_INPD factor. 
BRDAC_SIZER The residual value of the BRDAC_SIZE factor. 
BRDAC_MEETR The residual of the BRDAC_MEET factor. 
BRDAC_ACCEXP
R 
The residual value of the BRDAC_ACCEXP factor. 
ECSIGN A dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 for a positive current financial year earnings per share 
change and 0 otherwise. 
BAD A dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast indicates an 
expected negative change in the current year earnings and 0 otherwise. 
GOOD A dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast indicates an 
expected positive change in the current year earnings and 0 otherwise. 
ECHANGE The natural logarithm of the absolute value of the percentage change in earnings per share deflated 
by share price at the beginning of the financial year. 
SIZE The natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of the current financial year. 
CROSSLIST A dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed on a foreign exchange and 0 
otherwise. 
MB The natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end 
of the current financial year. 
MEFORDER The order of the management earnings forecasts. 
NREVENT A dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast is released 
through a non-routine announcement and 0 otherwise. 
IMR The Inverse Mills Ratio based on Model 1a – FORECAST1, which is included to account for the 
self-selection bias inherent in analysing data that is conditional on a management earnings forecast 
being issued. 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection Procedure 
Selecting Criteria Number of Observations 
Sample Firms  
Total firms listed in the Events section of the NZX database as at 17 September 2008 317 
Less firms listed on the Events section of the NZX database not covered by the NZX database (113) 
Less firms listed on the NZAX (31) 
Less firms not issuing at least 5 annual reports since being listed on the NZSX or firms with missing market announcements (48) 
Total firms in the final sample 125 
Sample Firm-years  
Total firm-years in the final sample 8971 
Total firm-years in the sub-sample 2652 
Sample Management Earnings Forecasts  
Total market announcements in the final sample 32,690 
Less market announcements not containing management earnings forecasts (31,608) 
Total management earnings forecasts in the final sample 1,082 
Total range and point management earnings forecasts in the final sample 449 
Total management earnings forecasts in the sub-sample. 350 
Total range and point management earnings forecasts in the sub-sample 190 
1 The total number of firm-years includes all firm-years with financial reporting dates ending between 31 January 1998 and 31 December 2007. 
2 Among these 897 firm-years, there are 265 firm-years where firms fully disclosed the level of independence, size, number of meetings and level of 
accounting expertise on boards of directors and audit committees in their annual reports. 
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Table 2 
Correlation Matrix for Board Structure Indicators 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 CEOCHAIR BRDINDP BRDSIZE 
BRDINDP 0.325 
0.000** 
  
BRDSIZE 0.143 
0.000** 
0.134 
0.000** 
 
AC 0.070 
0.036* 
0.120 
0.000** 
0.220 
0.000** 
Panel B: Sub-sample 
 CEOCHAIR BRDINDP BRDSIZE BRDMEET BRDACCEXP ACINDP ACSIZE ACMEET 
BRDINDP 0.254 
0.000** 
       
BRDSIZE 0.205 
0.001** 
0.108 
0.079^ 
      
BRDMEET 0.115 
0.062^ 
0.021 
0.730 
-0.016 
0.790 
     
BRDACCEXP 0.151 
0.014* 
0.051 
0.411 
-0.019 
0.758 
0.051 
0.409 
    
ACINDP 0.216 
0.000** 
0.397 
0.000** 
0.123 
0.046* 
0.059 
0.338 
0.141 
0.021* 
   
ACSIZE 0.095 
0.122 
0.098 
0.110 
0.437 
0.000** 
-0.021 
0.735 
0.111 
0.071^ 
-0.002 
0.977 
  
ACMEET 0.200 
0.001** 
0.056 
0.363 
0.317 
0.000** 
0.288 
0.000** 
-0.148 
0.016* 
-0.003 
0.961 
0.089 
0.147 
 
ACACCEXP 0.199 
0.001** 
0.158 
0.010* 
0.076 
0.219 
0.082 
0.186 
0.758 
0.000** 
0.126 
0.040* 
-0.050 
0.420 
-0.104 
0.090^ 
^, * and ** denote significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). Pearson, point-biserial and Phi correlation coefficients are followed by p-
value. See section 3 for definitions of board structure indicators. 
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Table 3 
Board Structure Factors Identified in Exploratory Principal Component Factor 
Factor Factor Name Board Structure Indicators Factor Loadings 
Panel A: Full Sample 
1 BRDINDP (Board independence) CEOCHAIR (Separate CEO and Chairman) 0.823 
BRDINDP (Non-executive directors on the board) 0.794 
2 BRDSIZEAC (Board size and audit committee) BRDSIZE (Board size) 0.738 
AC (Audit committee) 0.813 
Panel B: Sub-sample 
1 BRDAC_INDP (Board and audit committee independence) CEOCHAIR (Separate CEO and Chairman) 0.461 
BRDINDP (Non-executive directors on the board) 0.810 
ACINDP (Non-executive directors on the audit 
committee) 
0.801 
2 BRDAC_SIZE (Board and audit committee size) BRDSIZE (Board size) 0.825 
ACSIZE (Audit committee size) 0.827 
3 BRDAC_MEET (Board and audit committee meeting) BRDMEET (Board meeting) 0.803 
ACMEET (Audit committee meeting) 0.750 
4 BRDAC_ACCEXP (Board and audit committee accounting expertise) BRDACCEXP (Board accounting expertise) 0.935 
ACACCEXP (Audit committee accounting expertise) 0.919 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics – Firm Years and Management Earnings Forecasts 
 Full Sample Sub-sample 
 Frequency 
Mean 
Percentage 
Median 
Frequency 
Mean 
Percentage 
Median 
Panel A: Firm-years 
Non pre-empted and pre-empted firm-years 
Non pre-empted firm-
years 
386 43.03% 114 43.02% 
Pre-empted firm-years 511 56.97% 151 56.98% 
Routine pre-empted and non-routine pre-empted firm-years 
Routine pre-empted firm-
years 
320 35.67% 83 31.32% 
Non-routine pre-empted 
firm-years 
191 21.29% 68 25.66% 
Qualitative pre-empted and quantitative (open-ended, range and point) pre-empted firm-years 
Qualitative pre-empted 
firm-years 
212 23.63% 43 16.23% 
Quantitative pre-empted 
firm-years 
299 33.33% 108 40.75% 
Number of management earnings forecasts per firm-years 
0 386 43.03% 114 43.02% 
1 190 21.18% 51 19.25% 
2 157 17.50% 43 16.23% 
3 104 11.59% 34 12.83% 
4 42 4.68% 10 3.77% 
5 13 1.45% 10 3.77% 
6 3 0.33% 1 0.38% 
7 1 0.11% 1 0.38% 
8 1 0.11% 1 0.38% 
Number of non-routine management earnings forecasts per firm-years 
0 706 78.71% 197 74.34% 
1 138 15.38% 46 17.36% 
2 39 4.35% 14 5.28% 
3 12 1.34% 6 2.26% 
4 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
5 1 0.11% 1 0.38% 
6 1 0.11% 1 0.38% 
Number of quantitative management earnings forecasts per firm-years 
0 598 66.67% 157 59.25% 
1 136 15.16% 41 15.47% 
2 85 9.48% 32 12.08% 
3 48 5.35% 21 7.92% 
4 22 2.45% 7 2.64% 
5 5 0.56% 5 1.89% 
6 2 0.22% 1 0.38% 
7 1 0.11% 1 0.38% 
Panel B: Management Earnings Forecasts 
Forecast horizon 184 168 180 155 
Forecast precision 
Qualitative 500 46.21% 116 33.14% 
Open-ended 133 12.29% 44 12.57% 
Range 149 13.77% 90 25.71% 
Point 300 27.73% 100 28.57% 
Forecast error 0.051 0.004 0.017 0.003 
Forecast bias 0.034 0 0.004 0 
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Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics – Corporate Governance Characteristics 
 Frequency/Mean Percentage/Median 
Panel A: Full sample 
REFORM (post-reform) 523 58.31% 
ANALYST (followed by analysts) 410 45.71% 
OWNCON 0.185 0.122 
CEOCHAIR (separate CEO and Chairman) 806 89.86% 
BRDINDP 0.820 0.833 
BRDSIZE 6.065 6 
AC (audit committee) 790 88.07% 
Panel B: Sub-sample 
REFORM (post-reform) 189 71.32% 
ANALYST (followed by analysts) 176 66.42% 
OWNCON 0.206 0.148 
CEOCHAIR (separate CEO and Chairman) 234 88.30% 
BRDINDP 0.857 0.857 
BRDSIZE 6.913 6 
BRDMEET 10.472 10 
BRDACCEXP 0.265 0.250 
ACINDP 0.970 1 
ACSIZE 3.472 3 
ACMEET 3.743 3 
ACACCEXP 0.400 0.333 
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Table 6 
Predicted Signs for the Coefficients on Independent Variables 
 Model 1 
FORECAST1 
Model 1 
FORECAST2 
Model 2 
FREQUENCY1 
Model 2 
FREQUENCY2 
Model 3 
HORIZON 
Model 4a 
FORECAST3 
Model 4b 
FREQUENCY3 
Model 4c 
PRECISION 
Model 5a 
ERROR 
Model 5b 
BIAS 
REFORM + + + + + + + + - - 
ANALYST + + + + + + + + - - 
H + + + + + + + + - - 
H2 - - - - - - - - + + 
BRDINDPR 
(full sample) 
+ + + + + + + + - - 
BRDSIZEACR 
(full sample) 
+ + + + + + + + - - 
BRDAC_INDPR 
(sub-sample) 
+ + + + + + + + - - 
BRDAC_SIZER 
(sub-sample) 
+ + + + + + + + - - 
BRDAC_MEETR 
(sub-sample) 
+ + + + + + + + - - 
BRDAC_ACCEXPR 
(sub-sample) 
+ + + + + + + + - - 
ECSIGN ? ? ? ?  ? ?    
BAD     ?   ? ? ? 
GOOD     ?   ? ? ? 
ECHANGE + + + + + + + + + ? 
SIZE + + + + + + + + - - 
CROSSLIST ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
MB ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
MEFORDER     -      
NREVENT        +   
HORIZON        - + ? 
POINT         + ? 
IMR     ?   ? ? ? 
See section 3 for definitions of independent variables. 
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Table 7 
Regression Analysis for Full Sample Firm-years and Management Earnings Forecasts 
 Model 1 
FORECAST1 
Model 1 
FORECAST2 
Comparison 1/0 
Model 1 
FORECAST2 
Comparison 2/0 
Model 2 
FREQUENCY1 
Model 2 
FREQUENCY2 
Model 3 
HORIZON 
Model 4a 
FORECAST3 
Model 4b 
FREQUENCY3 
Model 4c 
PRECISION 
Model 5a 
ERROR 
Model 5b 
BIAS 
Variable Coefficient 
(z-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(z-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(z-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(z-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(z-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(z-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(z-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(z-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept -3.175 
(-4.090**) 
-5.503 
(-3.750**) 
-4.291 
(-3.450**) 
-2.372 
(-4.160**) 
-2.521 
(-2.750**) 
372.962 
(1.380) 
 -3.009 
(-3.750**) 
 -39.935 
(-3.780**) 
0.091 
(0.630) 
REFORM 0.382 
(4.180**) 
0.169 
(1.260) 
1.126 
(6.970**) 
0.485 
(7.060**) 
1.227 
(7.360**) 
-16.081 
(-0.700) 
0.443 
(5.330**) 
0.945 
(8.880**) 
0.795 
(2.320*) 
2.664 
(2.880**) 
0.044 
(3.460**) 
ANALYST 0.208 
(1.950*) 
0.217 
(1.390^) 
0.367 
(2.110*) 
0.268 
(3.620**) 
0.255 
(1.690*) 
0.547 
(0.040) 
0.305 
(3.200**) 
0.472 
(4.560**) 
0.389 
(2.040*) 
1.884 
(3.720**) 
0.014 
(2.010*) 
H 21.091 
(2.390**) 
32.095 
(1.840*) 
26.143 
(1.870*) 
15.181 
(2.410**) 
9.056 
(0.990) 
285.871 
(0.210) 
20.82 
(2.600**) 
16.242 
(1.810*) 
39.991 
(1.980*) 
300.200 
(5.540**) 
1.740 
(2.350*) 
H2 -74.437 
(-2.290*) 
-106.396 
(-1.780*) 
-97.527 
(-1.870*) 
-57.744 
(-2.570**) 
-43.481 
(-1.210) 
-1097.663 
(-0.230) 
-79.746 
(-2.710**) 
-63.49 
(-2.010*) 
-137.899 
(-1.950*) 
-1095.165 
(-5.770**) 
-6.620 
(-2.550**) 
BRDINDPR 0.117 
(2.580**) 
0.158 
(2.370**) 
0.131 
(1.650^) 
0.141 
(3.730**) 
0.041 
(0.560) 
2.519 
(0.320) 
0.114 
(2.710**) 
0.211 
(3.710**) 
0.290 
(2.450**) 
1.107 
(3.500**) 
0.004 
(1.040) 
BRDSIZEACR -0.054 
(-1.020) 
-0.158 
(-2.050*) 
0.147 
(1.470^) 
-0.030 
(-0.760) 
0.212 
(2.280*) 
-4.393 
(-0.970) 
-0.044 
(-0.920) 
0.061 
(1.030) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.323 
(-1.640^) 
-0.008 
(-2.820**) 
ECSIGN 0.058 
(0.650) 
0.250 
(1.910^) 
-0.209 
(-1.440) 
0.0160 
(0.260) 
-0.358 
(-2.890**) 
 0.037 
(0.470) 
-0.035 
(-0.410) 
   
BAD      -45.920 
(-6.200**) 
  -0.194 
(-1.760^) 
-0.620 
(-2.530*) 
-0.003 
(-1.020) 
GOOD      -8.226 
(-1.300) 
  -0.598 
(-6.550**) 
0.096 
(0.410) 
0.000 
(-0.130) 
ECHANGE 0.050 
(1.870*) 
0.011 
(0.280) 
0.158 
(3.460**) 
0.036 
(1.880*) 
0.212 
(5.200**) 
-3.750 
(-1.140) 
0.049 
(1.990*) 
0.042 
(1.590^) 
0.056 
(1.160) 
0.751 
(6.150**) 
0.006 
(3.740**) 
SIZE 0.103 
(3.820**) 
0.157 
(3.900**) 
0.108 
(2.350*) 
0.076 
(3.890**) 
0.047 
(1.180) 
-3.442 
(-0.550) 
0.075 
(3.030**) 
0.046 
(1.740*) 
0.066 
(0.710) 
0.368 
(1.540^) 
0.006 
(1.700*) 
CROSSLIST -0.577 
(-4.270**) 
-0.914 
(-4.460**) 
-0.504 
(-2.290*) 
-0.246 
(-2.560*) 
-0.138 
(-0.740) 
33.526 
(0.980) 
-0.379 
(-3.060**) 
0.126 
(1.030) 
-0.203 
(-0.400) 
-3.714 
(-2.880**) 
-0.046 
(-2.620**) 
MB 0.065 
(1.210) 
0.058 
(0.730) 
0.153 
(1.710^) 
0.020 
(0.490) 
0.099 
(1.220) 
-3.408 
(-0.630) 
0.089 
(1.800^) 
0.141 
(2.580*) 
0.156 
(1.940^) 
0.388 
(1.910^) 
0.001 
(0.360) 
MEFORDER      -49.680 
(-20.560**) 
     
NREVENT         0.639 
(6.610**) 
  
HORIZON         -0.001 
(-3.130**) 
0.003 
(3.100**) 
0.000 
(1.510) 
POINT          -0.608 
(-2.900**) 
0.004 
(1.500) 
IMR      -59.964 
(-0.590) 
  2.141 
(1.410) 
15.531 
(3.890**) 
0.172 
(3.150**) 
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Estimated Cutpoint 1      2.515  5.308   
Estimated Cutpoint 2      3.177  5.691   
Estimated Cutpoint 3        6.132   
Pseudo R2 0.081  0.062 0.114  0.063 0.108 0.094   
Adjusted R2     0.333    0.254 0.118 
Model χ2 99.170 153.850 174.940 146.500  120.610 235.880 253.490   
F-statistic     39.580    11.190 5.010 
p-value 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
N 897 897 897 897 897 897 897 1,082 449 449 
^, * and ** denotes significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels. One-tailed (two-tailed) test is used when coefficient sign is predicted (not predicted). See section 3 for model details and definitions of dependent and 
independent variables. 
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Table 8 
Regression Analysis for Sub-sample Firm-years and Management Earnings Forecasts 
 Model 1 
FORECAST1 
Model 1 
FORECAST2 
Comparison 1/0 
Model 1 
FORECAST2 
Comparison 2/0 
Model 2 
FREQUENCY1 
Model 2 
FREQUENCY2 
Model 3 
HORIZON 
Model 4a 
FORECAST3 
Model 4b 
FREQUENCY3 
Model 4c 
PRECISION 
Model 5a 
ERROR 
Model 5b 
BIAS 
Variable Coefficient 
(z-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(z-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(z-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(z-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(z-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(z-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(z-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(z-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept 4.309 
(0.970) 
0.414 
(0.060) 
9.211 
(1.300) 
1.719 
(1.670^) 
1.730 
(0.960) 
410.540 
(3.870**) 
 0.650 
(0.470) 
0.616 
(1.560^) 
-9.580 
(-3.500**) 
0.394 
(12.320**) 
REFORM 0.557 
(2.910**) 
0.398 
(1.420^) 
1.541 
(4.050**) 
0.631 
(4.240**) 
1.124 
(3.510**) 
17.850 
(0.660) 
0.602 
(3.400**) 
1.190 
(5.330**) 
0.507 
(1.860*) 
-0.360 
(-0.410) 
-0.026 
(-2.520**) 
ANALYST 0.387 
(2.000*) 
0.181 
(0.630) 
1.052 
(3.190**) 
0.389 
(2.860**) 
0.623 
(2.210*) 
2.875 
(0.150) 
0.523 
(2.990**) 
0.694 
(3.930**) 
-3.640 
(-0.170) 
0.569 
(0.930) 
-0.022 
(-3.060**) 
H -67.178 
(-1.280) 
-37.161 
(-0.430) 
-143.891 
(-1.720*) 
-35.674 
(-3.190**) 
-42.377 
(-2.340*) 
-1112.966 
(-0.740) 
-52.019 
(-1.430^) 
-37.300 
(-2.450**) 
17.358 
(0.250) 
140.751 
(3.040**) 
2.208 
(4.080**) 
H2 194.444 
(1.200) 
101.445 
(0.390) 
431.777 
(1.670*) 
117.700 
(2.830**) 
142.721 
(2.020*) 
2906.435 
(0.610) 
147.037 
(1.280) 
136.918 
(2.490**) 
-0.068 
(-0.530) 
-538.915 
(-3.730**) 
-7.356 
(-4.360**) 
BRDAC_INDPR 0.145 
(1.730*) 
0.169 
(1.340^) 
0.192 
(1.290^) 
0.103 
(1.520^) 
0.158 
(1.110) 
-4.716 
(-0.530) 
0.098 
(1.260) 
0.092 
(1.050) 
0.152 
(0.630) 
0.699 
(2.610**) 
-0.008 
(-2.460**) 
BRDAC_SIZER 0.372 
(3.730**) 
0.485 
(3.300**) 
0.534 
(3.150**) 
0.337 
(5.150**) 
0.398 
(2.950**) 
9.061 
(0.540) 
0.334 
(3.680**) 
0.399 
(4.800**) 
0.024 
(0.140) 
0.073 
(0.140) 
-0.019 
(-3.110**) 
BRDAC_MEETR 0.258 
(2.690**) 
0.222 
(1.510^) 
0.528 
(3.290**) 
0.317 
(5.070**) 
0.508 
(4.400**) 
13.692 
(1.120) 
0.217 
(2.470**) 
0.379 
(4.830**) 
-0.093 
(-1.190) 
0.320 
(0.860) 
-0.013 
(-3.090**) 
BRDAC_ACCEXPR 0.074 
(0.820) 
0.082 
(0.610) 
0.066 
(0.460) 
0.146 
(2.500**) 
0.172 
(1.570^) 
10.559 
(1.930*) 
0.056 
(0.680) 
0.091 
(1.260) 
0.616 
(1.560^) 
0.184 
(1.320^) 
-0.004 
(-2.160*) 
ECSIGN 0.123 
(0.720) 
0.345 
(1.360) 
-0.209 
(-0.760) 
0.018 
(0.160) 
-0.470 
(-2.210*) 
 0.049 
(0.320) 
-0.055 
(-0.400) 
   
BAD      -52.732 
(-3.960**) 
  -0.409 
(-2.150*) 
-0.528 
(-1.770^) 
0.004 
(1.040) 
GOOD      -7.569 
(-0.650) 
  -0.724 
(-4.470**) 
-0.564 
(-2.020*) 
0.000 
(0.040) 
ECHANGE 0.030 
(0.560) 
0.003 
(0.030) 
0.108 
(1.200) 
0.039 
(1.100) 
0.228 
(3.360**) 
-2.987 
(-0.890) 
0.020 
(0.420) 
0.040 
(0.920) 
-0.024 
(-0.500) 
0.305 
(3.230**) 
-0.001 
(-0.970) 
SIZE 0.051 
(0.980) 
0.111 
(1.390^) 
0.026 
(0.300) 
0.012 
(0.340) 
-0.024 
(-0.360) 
-4.533 
(-1.010) 
0.017 
(0.350) 
-0.019 
(-0.440) 
-0.080 
(-1.250) 
-0.126 
(-1.070) 
-0.002 
(-1.560^) 
CROSSLIST -0.396 
(-1.760^) 
-0.768 
(-2.200*) 
-0.180 
(-0.490) 
0.061 
(0.400) 
0.057 
(0.200) 
12.060 
(0.550) 
-0.200 
(-0.950) 
0.419 
(2.300*) 
0.288 
(0.930) 
-0.193 
(-0.320) 
0.022 
(3.160**) 
MB 0.152 
(1.410) 
0.285 
(1.740^) 
0.151 
(0.860) 
0.140 
(1.970*) 
-0.012 
(-0.090) 
6.702 
(0.730) 
0.157 
(1.600) 
0.280 
(3.240**) 
0.312 
(2.340*) 
0.020 
(0.080) 
-0.013 
(-4.510**) 
MEFORDER      -47.466 
(-12.560**) 
     
NREVENT         0.683 
(4.230**) 
  
HORIZON         -0.002 
(-3.280**) 
0.004 
(3.570**) 
0.000 
(1.920^) 
POINT          -1.103 0.000 
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(-4.740**) (0.070) 
IMR      67.395 
(0.870) 
  0.426 
(0.380) 
-0.068 
(-0.030) 
-0.107 
(-3.660**) 
Estimated Cutpoint 1      -3.644  -1.439   
Estimated Cutpoint 2      -3.170  -0.982   
Estimated Cutpoint 3        -0.125   
Pseudo R2 0.135  0.115 0.187  0.101 0.164 0.139   
Adjusted R2     0.361    0.410  
Model χ2 48.740 61.940 10..460 86.810  54.780 125.770 129.790   
F-statistic     13.310    8.710 0.152 
p-value 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
N 265 265 265 265 350 265 265 350 190 190 
^, * and ** denotes significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels. One-tailed (two-tailed) test is used when coefficient sign is predicted (not predicted). See section 3 for model details and definitions of dependent and 
independent variables. 
 
 
Table 9 
Sensitivity Analysis 
ECHANGE_VOL (change in earnings per share volatility 
over the prior five financial years) included in all models 
Hirst et al. (2008) The ECHANGE_VOL coefficient is not significant in any model. 
Except for the ECHANGE coefficient losing its significance, other results are not different from the 
main findings. Correlation test shows that ECHANGE_VOL is highly positively correlated with 
ECHANGE which may explain the reduced significance of ECHANGE. 
CAPITAL_RAISING (a dichotomous variable taking the 
value of 1 if the firm raises capital during the financial 
year and 0 otherwise) is included in models 1, 2 and 4a-c 
Frankel et al. (1995) The CAPITAL_RAISING coefficient is not significant in any model. 
Other results are not different from the main findings. 
Dichotomous variables for six major industries: (1) 
materials, mining or energy, (2) technology, 
telecommunication or biotechnology, (3) financial 
services, (4) utilities, airports, airlines, ports or shipping, 
(5) manufacturing or healthcare and (6) consumer 
staples, are included in all models. 
Hirst et al. (2008) Firms in the materials, mining or energy industry and financial services industry were less likely to 
provide earnings forecasts (overall, non-routine and quantitative). 
Firms in the technology, telecommunication or biotechnology industry tended to provide earnings 
forecasts of longer horizons but their earnings forecasts were more optimistically biased. 
Firms in the utilities, airports, airlines, ports or shipping industry were more inclined to provide 
routine earnings forecasts. 
Firms in the manufacturing or healthcare industry and consumer staples industry were more likely 
to provide earnings forecasts (overall, non-routine and quantitative) and these earnings forecasts 
were issued more frequently. 
Other results are not different from the main findings. 
All models are retested after dropping firm-years that fall 
within six months of the effective date of the reform (i.e. 
approximately 12 months around 1 December 2002). 
Frijns et al. (2008) 
Dunstan et al. (2011) 
The results are not different from the main findings. 
White’s heteroscedasticity standard errors are estimated 
for all models. 
Dunstan et al. (2011) The results are not different from the main findings. 
 
